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CARTESIAN CERTAINTY AND THE  
INFINITY OF THE WILL 
Joseph K. Cosgrove 
I am certainly very pleased with my freedom . . . 
—Descartes, Fifth Replies1 
escartes's Meditations, read in light of the expressed aim of Cartesian 
philosophy—foundations for a mathematical science of nature—leaves the 
contemporary reader with a sense of unease. The metaphysical apparatus seems in 
some way disproportional to the end product. The determining concepts of Cartesian 
physics are present, after all, as early as the unpublished Regulae and the suppressed 
Le Monde, from which the metaphysical apparatus is absent. As for the Meditations, it 
is difficult to see in the procedure of hyperbolical doubt, for instance, anything crucial 
to the scientific enterprise as such. Indeed, the doubting procedure itself seems to 
presuppose Descartes's dualistic conception of mind and body and its corollary, the 
cognitive defectiveness of the senses. Moreover, if it is true to say that modern science 
is in some way essentially "Cartesian," why in its subsequent historical development 
has it based itself, as it were, on the "bracketing" of metaphysics? 
D
If a degree of consensus has emerged on the matter, it is that Cartesian 
metaphysics represents less a concern with epistemological foundationalism per se than 
with specific cognitive requirements of the new mathematical physics.2 Here the 
scientific and metaphysical programs of the Meditations evidently intersect. With the 
"thinking substance" (res cogitans) of Meditations II, for instance, "matter" has in 
essence already been stripped of the substantial forms and final causes that impede the 
new science, and mind has been freed from the passivity that renders it susceptible to 
sense deception. A double movement is in fact discernable in Descartes's metaphysics, 
a foundational pathway in the ordo cognoscendi intersecting multiply with the 
ontology of thinking and extended substance in the ordo essendi. Thus the cogito at 
once 
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serves as a link in the chain of reasons eventuating in the certification of clear and 
distinct ideas, and yields as its ontological remainder a desideratum of mathematical 
physics, the concept of extension. This almost seamless integration of the 
epistemological program with the mathematico-mechanistic enterprise in physics is 
perhaps the most impressive achievement of the Meditations. 
Despite its merits, however, the "scientific" reading of Cartesian metaphysics does 
not really resolve the apparent disproportion remarked above. Clearly, the Descartes of 
the Meditations is engaged in some form of epistemological foundationalism, and 
however congenial the foundations secured ultimately prove to a particular scientific 
epistemology or mathematico-mechanistic conception of nature, neither would seem to 
require them. To put it simply, Descartes is seeking absolute certainty in some sense, 
but mathematical physics does not seem to require absolute certainty. Indeed, as has so 
often been pointed out, Descartes himself does not seem to demand certainty when it 
comes to the actual practice of physics. Why, then, does he nonetheless put forth 
certainty as the aim of the Meditations? 
One plausible, but ultimately unsatisfying, response is that the certification of the 
human intellect as a reliable instrument of probabilistic cognition in science requires 
certainty in the metaphysical foundations of science. If God is free to achieve a 
particular effect in nature via any number of physical mechanisms, then such effects 
will admit of multiple explanation and will have to be approached 
hypothetico-deductively/ probabilistically. The metaphysical principles which ground 
this very hypothetico-deductive framework, however, must be held to a higher 
standard. We require indubitability of first principles not because of any inherent 
unwillingness to tolerate even the slightest possibility of their being wrong, but 
because at this level any such possibility immediately translates into a fatal 
compromise of the cognitive faculties in their scientific employment.3 But from our 
vantage point it is simply not true that probabilistic cognition requires indubitable 
foundations. And from Descartes's own vantage point, why celebrate the new science if 
it yields mere probability when it comes to what most matters in the end, namely, 
scientific insight into the particular effects of nature, manipulation of which constitutes 
the fruit of the "tree of philosophy"? 
While it has sometimes been maintained that concessions to probability and 
"moral certainty," especially in later writings such as the Principles, constitute an 
implicit admission of failure regarding the scientific enterprise originally outlined in 
the Regulae, Descartes himself treats with impatience any suggestion that his scientific 
project is compromised on the matter of certainty. The aim of the foundational- 
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ism of the Meditations is therefore a question deserving of additional consideration. To 
that end, we shall explore the Cartesian concept of certainty in terms of the dynamics 
of power between God, human beings, and nature. We shall see that although the 
essential aim of Cartesian philosophy is indeed certainty rather than mathematical 
physics per se, certainty in the originary Cartesian sense represents less a quest for the 
elimination of the possibility for error than a fundamental posture of control toward 
reality, of which Descartes's scientific enterprise ("mastery of nature") constitutes a 
particular expression. The key to Cartesian certainty, that is to say, is the infinitude, 
and finally the incoherence, of the Cartesian will. 
CERTAINTY AND PROBABILITY 
In the first Meditation, having introduced the omnipotent God as potential deceiver, 
Descartes observes that at least some of his habitual opinions (for example, that he has 
hands or that two plus three equals five) nevertheless remain "highly probable" ("valde 
probabiles") and are "still much more reasonable to believe than to deny" (CSM I: 15; 
AT VII: 15). While Descartes's meaning is in one sense clear enough—he is doubting 
hyperbolically in the service of science—what kind of judgment regarding 
"probability" is possible at this point in the "order of reasons"? The remark precedes 
the introduction of the cogito; hence, from a scientific point of view, all of Descartes's 
longstanding opinions are entirely without foundation. It therefore makes little sense to 
say they are "probable" if by probable is meant "likely to be true." The seemingly 
innocuous remark about probability in fact signals an ambiguity in the original position 
of the Cartesian meditator. Probability would presumably be sufficient for a person of 
naïve "common sense," whereas the meditator, dissatisfied with probability, has 
already taken an initial step into scientific consciousness. Thus, while according to the 
narrative urged upon us by Descartes the author, the decisive move is the cogito, where 
the meditator first attains a scientific foothold, in a truer sense the decisive move has 
been made already before the narrative starts, "some years ago" when "I was struck by 
the large number of falsehoods that I had accepted" in childhood and "realized that it 
was necessary ... to demolish everything" (CSM I: 12; AT VII: 17). 
Why is the meditator dissatisfied with probability? Descartes's example of a basket 
from which one dumps all the apples and examines them one by one, removing any 
rotten ones to ensure that the rot does not spread (Seventh Replies; CSM II: 324; AT 
VII: 481) suggests that some of his longstanding beliefs will prove true and be 
reinstated in their original form. But this turns out not to be the case. The most 
probable of these beliefs, that his body exists, for instance, or that two plus three 
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equals five, will be reinstated only upon new foundations. Moreover, some probable 
opinions, such as beliefs about sense qualities, will prove inherently corrupt. Thus 
from a scientific perspective, all the apples in the basket are rotten. The term 
"probability" is evidently functioning here essentially as a simple designation for 
pre-scientific cognition. It is "probable" not in the sense that it is likely to be true, but 
rather in the sense that there must be something to it, so to speak, since it works. Such 
cognition originates in what Descartes elsewhere calls the "teaching of nature," 
described in detail in the sixth Meditation.4 The sensation of pain, for instance, helps 
keep my foot out of the fire, even though it misleads me into believing that the 
"hotness" I feel is in the fire itself. Similarly, although an apple's taste is something 
within me, the erroneous notion that sweetness is actually in the apple impels me to 
eat. Such ideas, confused though they may be from a scientific perspective, have 
survival value, so "I should not doubt that there is some truth" in them (CSM II: 56; 
AT VII: 80). And, when the term "probabilis" recurs in the fourth Meditation, it once 
again designates a kind of plausible cognition that falls short of science: "For although 
probable conjectures may pull me in one direction, the mere knowledge that they are 
simply conjectures, and not certain and indubitable reasons, is itself quite enough to 
push my assent the other way" (CSM II: 41; AT VII: 59). These probable conjectures 
(the existence of the meditator's body, for instance), it would seem, fail in toto of truth, 
even if there is little or no chance that they are mistaken. 
By contrast, two instances of the term "probabilis" in the Meditations can 
arguably be taken in a methodical or scientific sense. The first is in Meditations I, 
where Descartes observes that the less powerful is the author of his being, the "more 
likely [probabilius] it is that I am so imperfect as to be deceived all the time" (CSM I: 
14; AT VII: 21). This would seem to be a more or less methodically considered 
probabilitas, resting as it does upon clear and distinct notions of causality and per-
fection. The second instance is in the discussion leading up to the proof of the 
existence of the meditator's body in Meditations VI. Based on the experience of 
imagination, which "seems to be nothing else but the application of the cognitive 
faculty to a body which is intimately present to it, and which therefore exists" (CSM I: 
50; AT VII: 71-72), the meditator "can make a probable conjecture (probabiliter inde 
conjicio) that the body exists. But this is only a probability," not a "necessary 
inference" (CSM I: 51; AT VII: 73). Again, this would appear to be a more or less 
rigorous use of "probabilis" Although the argument will be clinched only by appeal to 
the veracity of God, the conjecture from imagination is not based on a "mere" 
probability stemming from common sense habit or prejudice. 
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Thus we appear to be faced with a double connotation to the term 
"probability"—non-methodical cognition on the one hand versus approximation to 
truth on the other. Cotgrave's Dictionarie of 1611 lists under probable/probabilité both 
"likelihood" of truth and "appearance" of truth.5 Our contemporary sense of 
"probability," colored by the mathematical calculus of probability, tends to eclipse the 
latter connotation of the term at work in the Meditations and elsewhere. Discourse on 
Method Three, for instance, speaks of the practical necessity to sometimes adopt not 
the "truest opinions" ("les plus vrai opinions"), but rather the "most probable" ("les 
plus probables") (AT VI: 25). Indeed, Descartes employs the terms "probable" and 
"vraisemblable" synonymously in a letter to Mersenne of 5 October 1637: "Car je 
repute presque pour faux tout ce qui n'est vraisemblable; et quand je dis qu'une chose 
est aisée à croire je ne veux pas dire qu'elle est probable seulement, mais qu'elle est si 
claire et si evidente, qu'il n'est pas besoin que je m'arreste à la demonstrer."6 While 
"vraisemblance" is typically translated either "plausible" or "probable," its connotation 
here is clearly pejorative, giving it the sense of "mere appearance" of truth. Similarly, 
in Rule Two of the Regulae the term "probabilis" can indicate something positively 
unreliable, namely, the "probable syllogisms" (probabilium syllogismorum) of 
scholastic science (CSM I: 11; AT X: 363). It is not as if Descartes thinks that 
scholastic science is more likely than not true. 
If we consider Descartes's employment of "certum" in counterpoint to "probabilis" 
we are perhaps justified in discerning a similarly double connotation. Indeed, the term 
"certum" and its derivatives seem often to function in both senses 
simultaneously—"certainty" in the usual sense of indubitability, the limit of 
probability, and "certainty" as methodical, scientific cognition, incommensurate with 
any form of "mere probability."7 The distinction between methodical and 
non-methodical cognition thus cuts across the distinction between "certainty" and 
"probability" in the usual sense. In the ruling sense, Cartesian certainty and probability 
represent not points on a single continuum of likelihood, but rather an absolute 
disjunction between methodical and non-methodical cognition. Descartes does not 
allow any degree of truth to "mere probability," nor any possibility that it could be 
"improved into" certain knowledge by the accrual of evidence.8 He rather proposes 
something more akin to Plato's distinction between επιστημη and δοξa 
—two distinguishable cognitive faculties and their respective objects. We are therefore 
faced with a kind of "redoubled" schema of Cartesian probability and certainty. 
Pre-scientific cognition, itself determined by a continuum of probability and certainty 
in the usual sense is, from the point of view of scientific cognition, "mere probability" 
in toto; even its certainties, such as that one has hands or that the external world exists, 
or even that 2 
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+ 2 = 4, are merely probable. On the other hand, the entire continuum of scientific 
cognition, its mere probabilities (such as, for example, that water is made of eel-shaped 
particles9) no less than its certainties in the usual sense (that 2 + 2 = 4, for instance) is 
"certain" in the essential methodological sense that rules Cartesian philosophy. It is 
therefore less than illuminating to cast Cartesian method as a means to "certainty" in 
the usual sense. Method in a sense is certainty, for what matters fundamentally to 
Cartesian philosophy is not so much "indubitable" cognition as control or ownership of 
one's cognitions. 
CERTAINTY AND WILL 
In Meditations I, Descartes entertains the possibility that he might be misled even 
in his beliefs about mathematics and "other subjects of this kind, which deal only with 
the simplest and most general things, regardless of whether they really exist in nature 
or not," that, for instance, he might "go wrong every time I add two and three or count 
the sides of a square" (CSM II: 14; AT VII: 21). The ratio dubitande in this 
mathematical context is the susceptibility of human beings to error in cases where 
"they think they have the most perfect knowledge." Such a susceptibility might be 
attributable to a supremely powerful, but less than veracious, God. Since the passage 
places God on a level with "fate or chance or a continuous chain of events," the issue is 
not divine men-daciousness per se, but rather forces beyond Descartes's control which 
might compromise his cognitive faculties.10 In the final paragraph of the first 
Meditation these forces are personified as an Evil Genius with supreme powers of 
deception ("summe potentem & callidum") (CSM II: 15; AT VII: 22). Yet such powers 
are strictly limited, being unable to compel Descartes's assent to anything false: "Even 
if it is not in my power to know any truth, I shall at least do what is in my power, that 
is, resolutely guard against assenting to any falsehoods, so that the deceiver, however 
powerful and cunning he may be, will be unable to impose on me in the slightest 
degree." Let us designate this resolution to withhold assent the "first moment" of 
Cartesian certainty, namely, the power to summon into presence at will the absence of 
evidence.11 It is the original certainty because it places the meditator in control of his 
state of uncertainty. He can affirm one truth unconditionally: "I am not being 
deceived" ("So what remains true? Perhaps just the one fact that nothing is certain"; 
CSM II: 16; AT VII: 24). 
In Meditations III, Descartes revisits the Deus deceptor. The ratio dubitande cited 
is, once again, that "God could have given me a nature such that I am deceived even in 
matters that seemed most evident" (CSM II: 25; AT VII: 36). Yet this time he adds that 
"when I turn to the things themselves which I think I perceive very clearly, I am so 
convinced by 
CARTESIAN CERTAINTY AND THE INFINITY OF THE WILL 
them that I spontaneously declare: let whoever can do so deceive me, he will never 
bring it about that. . . two and three added together are more or less than five, or 
anything of this kind in which I see a manifest contradiction." The cogito of 
Meditations II has evidently intervened on behalf of mathematical knowledge. Clear 
and distinct ideas, at the time they are being perceived, are immune to the Deus 
deceptor. Thus Descartes's response in Second Replies to the charge of circularity in 
his proof for the existence of God: "When I said we can know nothing for certain until 
we are aware that God exists [and is not a deceiver], I expressly declared that I was 
speaking only of knowledge of those conclusions which can be recalled when we are 
no longer attending to the arguments by means of which we deduced them" (CSM II: 
100; AT VII: 140).12 As long as he attends to the proof, Descartes remarks in Medita-
tions V, he "cannot but believe" that the three angles of a triangle add up to two right 
angles." However, 
as soon as I turn my mind's eye away from the proof, then in spite of still 
remembering that I perceived it very clearly, I can easily fall into doubt 
about its truth, if I am unaware of God. For I can convince myself that I 
have a natural disposition to go wrong from time to time in matters which 
I think I perceive as evidently as can be. (CSM II: 48; AT VII: 69-70) 
Why would a possible "disposition to go wrong" compromise a remembered proof but 
not an immediate intellectual intuition? Because the evidence for the proof is not now 
present for affirmation by the will, and is for that reason outside the meditator's 
control. However, it can be summoned before the intellect at any time by an act of 
will. Thereby is secured the second moment of Cartesian certainty, the power to sum-
mon evidence into presence at will. The uniqueness of the cogito, which qua clear and 
distinct idea is not privileged over other clear and distinct ideas, lies in its producing 
its own evidence whenever it is thought. The first moment of certainty could not 
produce its own evidence—external forces (sense impressions, for instance, or a Deus 
deceptor) controlled the absence of evidence. In the second moment of certainty, the 
thinking ego enjoys not just the power of attention, but the ability to produce out of 
itself the very evidence to which it must attend (mathematicals, for instance, or the 
concept of extension). Thus in its second moment, certainty accrues to Descartes's 
ideas just so far as he himself is, to employ Spinoza's locution, their "adequate 
cause."13 
While Descartes's focus on the problem of dubitability (e.g., "As soon as we think 
that we correctly perceive something, we are spontaneously convinced" [CSM II: 103; 
AT VII, 103]; "I spontaneously declare . . ." [CSM II: 25; AT VII: 36]; "So long as I 
perceive something very clearly and distinctly I cannot but believe . . ." [CSM II: 48; 
AT VII: 69]) might 
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easily mislead us into thinking that we are here dealing with a psychological or 
subjective state, the very inability to doubt is consequent upon an act of will, namely, 
the focus of attention ("when I turn to the things themselves"). Indubitability is 
therefore posterior to freedom of the will.14 Moreover, Descartes's very emphasis on 
the "subject" signals that "objectivity" is being defined in terms of will. Any other 
sense of truth is without interest: 
What is it to us that someone may make out the perception whose truth 
we are so firmly convinced of may appear false to God or an angel, so 
that it is, absolutely speaking, false? Why should this alleged "absolute 
falsity" bother us, since we neither believe in it nor have even the smallest 
suspicion of it? For the supposition which we are making here is of a 
conviction so firm that it is quite incapable of being destroyed; and such a 
conviction is clearly the same as the most perfect certainty. (Second 
Replies; CSM II: 103; AT VII: 145) 
Certainty, therefore, is not the mere inability to doubt, which could always be a 
deception, but the ability to make oneself unable to doubt via the will to attention. In 
the final analysis, then, the much-debated question of whether prior to the proof for the 
existence of the veracious God in Meditations III, clear and distinct ideas are 
"objectively certain" or only psychologically or "subjectively certain" misses the point. 
Cartesian certainty precedes any distinction between "subjectivity" and "objectivity"; 
it itself sets up the domain of objectivity. 
A third moment of Cartesian certainty is necessitated by an inherent limitation of 
human nature, the intellect's inability to attend to all evidence at once in a single 
"mental vision" (Meditations V; CSM II: 48; AT VII: 69-70). God, the evidence for 
which can be summoned at will into presence all at once, therefore serves as a 
surrogate for the evidence of systematic scientific knowledge, which cannot. The 
human intellect, we are now assured, does "tend towards truth, at least when we use it 
correctly" (Second Replies; CSM II: 103; AT VII: 144). The will secures its total 
domain by summoning the evidence for God into presence, thereby redeeming the 
finitude of the human intellect, its inability to be simultaneously present to all truths. 
Only this posture of the will accounts for the seeming contradiction between 
Descartes's appeal to the veracity of God on the one hand and his dismissal of the same 
on the other ("What is it to us that someone may make out the perception whose truth 
we are so firmly convinced of may appear false to God or an angel . . . ?"; CSM II: 
103; AT VII: 144-145). Once the will has secured its preeminent status as arbiter of all 
truth, such "metaphysical falsity" poses no threat; for the assent of the will can no 
longer be shaken by inattentiveness and the failure of presence consequent upon it. 
This must explain why Descartes fails to address the seemingly obvious 
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question of whether an intellect for which continuous attention posed no difficulty (an 
angel?) would nonetheless be dependent upon divine certification of its ideas. 
We thus encounter three successive moments of certainty in the Meditations: (1) 
the ego's strength of will to attend to the absence of evidence, and thus refuse assent, 
regardless of any external influence; (2) the ego's strength of will to summon evidence 
into presence by producing out of itself that very evidence, and thus persist in assent; 
(3) divine certification of evidence that cannot be summoned into presence all at 
once.15 As acts of attention, moments (1) and (2) are on a level. Moment (3) seems 
clearly posterior to (2), which latter, although dependent on (3) from the perspective of 
the temporarily inattentive intellect, supports (3) while remaining independent of it in 
the order of reasons. Descartes has thus systematically subordinated God to the human 
will and its incontestable power of summoning evidence (or the absence thereof) into 
presence. If there were any doubt in the Meditations itself stemming from the 
ambiguity of the Deus deceptor/Evil Genius ("aliquem Deum" ["some God"; AT VII: 
21], "genium aliquem malignum" ["some Evil Genius"; AT VII: 22]),16 it is dispelled in 
Principles I, #6, where Descartes affirms as clearly as one could want the primacy of 
the human will: "But whoever turns out to have created us, and however powerful and 
however deceitful he may be, in the meantime we nonetheless experience within us the 
kind of freedom which enables us always to refrain from believing things which are not 
completely certain and thoroughly examined. Hence we are able to take precautions 
against going wrong on any occasion" (CSM I: 194; AT VIIIA: 6).17 God could not 
overrule the resolute will even if, per impossibile, deceit were compatible with 
omnipotence. While Richard Kennington famously argued that since the omnipotent 
God must inevitably put a stop to Cartesian inquiry, he must be abandoned in favor of a 
finite "Evil Genius," one should like to say rather that the omnipotent God is not 
abandoned, but simply put in his place. 
WILL AND ATTENTION 
It has long been observed by students of the Meditations that Descartes interprets truth 
in terms of certainty.18 In light of our analysis we should add that Descartes interprets 
certainty itself in terms of control, thus effectively defining truth as that which falls 
within the purview of the will. Having assigned to the omnipotent God his subsidiary if 
indispensable role, it would seem, the Cartesian will can proceed to assert its absolute 
preeminence across the range of human cognition. Yet Jean-Luc Marion, in his 
challenging analysis of Cartesian metaphysics, maintains that Descartes sets forth a 
"redoubled onto-theo-logy," in 
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which the cogitatio first submits all being (ens ut cogitatum), including God, to the 
conditions of its own rationality, only to be itself surpassed by God as causa: 
It is thus a case of a doubling that strengthens, and not of an incoherent or 
conflictual division: the entire first constitution, in addition to having its 
own proper articulation, is subsumed within the second constitution and 
plays the role of region of being in general. The onto-theo-logical 
constitution imposed by the dictat of reason thinks as ens causatum (thus 
according to an ontology) the totality of the onto-theo-logical constitution 
deployed in the first pronouncement about beings (cogitare), thus the ens 
ut cogitatio sui (ego, theology) as well as the ens ut cogitatum (ontology). 
Descartes doubles and strengthens onto-theo-logy by reinterpreting the 
first acceptation of esse—esse: cogitare—by means of a second, esse: 
causare.19 
From the perspective of Marion's analysis, it would appear that our entire account of 
Cartesian certainty as control would fall under the first figure of Cartesian metaphysics 
("ens ut cogitatum" and "ens ut cogitatio sui"), with the human will subsequently 
surpassed by the divine will in the redoubled onto-theology ("ens ut causatum"). We 
would therefore need to weaken our thesis regarding control as the ruling sense of 
Cartesian certainty, for Cartesian certainty would in this case be underwritten by a 
divine will that unambiguously surpasses the human will in the ordo essendi. 
To make Marion's case as forcefully as possible, God as infinite is capable of that 
which to us appears contradictory, namely, sovereignty over the human will, which 
latter "we experience within ourselves" as being absolutely free. According to Marion, 
the Cartesian will is "extra-metaphysical," its freedom predicated upon a release, 
through inattention, from the metaphysics of presence (that is to say, constant presence 
of evidence).20 Similarly, God understood under the attribute of infinity is 
incomprehensible and as such also beyond metaphysics.21 Since solely as regards 
liberty, but not causal power, is the human will itself infinite (and thus equal to the 
divine will), we cannot similarly affirm that the human will, in some way we cannot 
grasp, supercedes the divine will. Thus, our ability to "prevent ourselves from ever 
being deceived" must be understood as compatible with but nonetheless ultimately 
subordinate to God's power over the human will in the ordo essendi. Certainty as 
control itself suffers a redoubling—a controlled control. 
The resolution of this issue, to the extent that it can be resolved at all, must hinge 
on whether the "resolute will" that vanquishes the Deus deceptor in Meditations I and 
Principles I, #6 can be subsumed under the "official" Cartesian doctrine of will set 
forth in Meditations 
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IV. Specifically, given that human freedom is not clearly and distinctly understood, but 
rather experienced within ("I am certainly very pleased with my freedom since I 
experience it within myself," Descartes retorts to Gassendi in Fifth Replies; CSM II: 
259; AT VII: 377), what is the most coherent account of which the Cartesian will 
admits, and does that account point to the human will's ultimate subordination to the 
divine will? And given that the official account of the human will in Meditations IV is 
embedded in a theodicy, is it truly the divine will that is vindicated by that theodicy, or 
is it rather the human will? 
Human freedom of will, Descartes famously asserts in Meditations IV, is such as 
to constitute a form of equality with God: 
For although God's will is incomparably greater than mine, both in virtue 
of the knowledge and power that accompany it and make it more firm and 
efficacious, and also in virtue of its object, in that it ranges over a greater 
number of items, nevertheless it does not seem any greater than mine 
when considered as will in the essential and strict sense. This is because 
the will simply consists in our ability to do or not do something (that is, to 
affirm or deny, to pursue or avoid); or rather, it consists simply in the fact 
that when the intellect puts something forward for affirmation or denial or 
for pursuit or avoidance, our inclinations are such that we do not feel we 
are determined by any external force. (CSM II: 40; AT VII: 57) 
Of course, the fact that we do not "feel" such a force does not mean it is not there. 
Unlike the divine intellect, which differs only formally from the divine will, a created 
intellect cannot be purely active. Rather, will and intellect at the creaturely level differ 
as "the activity and passivity of one and the same substance. For strictly speaking, 
understanding is the passivity of the mind and willing its activity" (Descartes to 
Regius, May 1641; CSM III: 182; AT III: 372). Therefore, while in one sense certainty 
accrues to Descartes's ideas just so far as he himself is their "adequate cause," at the 
same time there is a certain bow to necessity, since the intellect does not create the 
truths it sets before the will for affirmation. But God's intellect is pure activity.22 God 
is therefore the adequate cause of his own cognitions in an unqualified sense. All truth 
must be posterior to the dictates of the divine will, for otherwise divine cognition 
would be in a dependent relation to something external. Thus the doctrine of divine 
creation of eternal truths: "The mathematical truths which you call eternal have been 
laid down by God and depend on him entirely no less than the rest of his creatures. 
Indeed to say that these truths are independent of God is to talk of him as if he were 
Jupiter or Saturn and to subject him to the Styx and the Fates" (Descartes to Mersenne, 
15 April 1630; CSM III: 23; AT I: 145).23 In the strict sense, then, a thing is 
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understood through its cause only in the "supreme indifference" (Sixth Replies; CSM 
II: 292; AT VII: 432) of the creator. 
The analogy between the divine will and the human will must therefore in some 
way break down, since human freedom is defined not in terms of indifference, but 
rather irresistible inclination of the will via clear and distinct ideas (Medit. IV; CSM II: 
41; AT VII: 58-59). Thus the primacy of the divine freedom would seem to be 
reestablished. Yet the human will's very "lack of indifference" is itself a function of 
willed attention. Indeed, since it contests the omnipotent deceiver, it must be 
determined by the highest form of attentiveness, one that overcomes "a kind of laziness 
[that] brings me back to normal life" (CSM II: 15; AT VII: 23). That decision for 
attentiveness must be determined by perception (via the intellect) of a "clearly known 
good," namely, the attainment of scientific cognition. Thus a previous decision will 
have to have been made for attentiveness to that good; judgment will be determined by 
attention, and attention will be determined by a judgment regarding the goodness of 
paying attention. To escape the infinite regress, the will must fall away from presence 
into inattention, in which case it lapses into some degree of indifference, the "lowest 
grade of freedom."24 This would not be overly objectionable, perhaps, were Descartes 
offering an account of the qualified and limited freedom of finite human beings. In the 
event, however, it compromises the absolute autonomy of the will, upon which the 
theodicy of Meditations IV depends and ultimately Cartesian certainty itself. The 
resolute will of Meditations I in fact falls under no coherent interpretation of Cartesian 
freedom. It is fitting, therefore, that Cartesian freedom be something we "feel" within 
ourselves as opposed to something clearly and distinctly perceived. Cartesian freedom, 
as Marion observes, is situated beyond the horizon of Cartesian metaphysics. We can 
only add that it is this very situation that renders Cartesian metaphysics possible. 
If the Cartesian doctrine of will finally admits of no coherent interpretation, we are 
left simply with the very self-assertion of the will, certified by our inner sense of a 
freedom that no omnipotent will or other external power could overrule. Indeed, the 
very incoherence of the Cartesian will only buttresses its primacy. A clear and distinct 
account of the will would situate it within Marion's first figure of metaphysics (ens ut 
cogitatum), only to be surpassed by the redoubled onto-theology of ens ut causatum, 
whether the ultimate causa were God or natural forces ("a continuous chain of effects") 
beyond our control. A coherent account of the human will, albeit as infinite and thus 
ultimately beyond human comprehension, would situate the human will beyond 
metaphysics, but the latter would nonetheless still be subordinate to an absolute divine 
infinitude that surpassed the qualified infinitude of the human 
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will. Such a divine will might, for reasons we cannot comprehend, elect to endow us 
with a cognitive faculty that misleads us into believing that omnipotence is 
incompatible with deception, for instance; or more realistically, natural forces might 
produce in us an "experience within" that deceives us regarding our possession of free 
will. Descartes's response to this possibility we have already remarked in Second 
Replies: "What is it to us that someone may make out that the perception whose truth 
we are so firmly convinced of may appear false to God or an angel. . . ?" But if such a 
"firm conviction" represents more than a merely psychological criterion of truth, it is 
because it is a product of the will itself which, through its willing, establishes the very 
domain of objectivity. Only the "feeling" of unrestrained liberty frees the Cartesian 
will from subjection to divine or natural powers altogether. It simply asserts itself as 
superior to any such powers. 
Zbigniew Janowski remarks on the analogy, first pointed out by Gouhier, between 
Augustinian original sin and Cartesian childhood.25 The difference, of course, is the 
efficacy of the Cartesian will in the face of this original condition. Via the notion of 
original sin, Augustine vindicates the goodness of God, since original sin does not 
proceed from God, although for reasons incomprehensible to us (but accountable in an 
"aesthetic theodicy" serving as a template for Descartes's own), God has allowed it. 
Descartes's theodicy, by contrast, ultimately vindicates the human will. The limitations 
of childhood do proceed from God, but the human will is able rectify them on its own. 
The vindication of God in the theodicy of Meditations IV serves to certify the 
Cartesian metaphysics of presence, itself a function of the human will. Descartes's 
repeated affirmations that his intellect will lead him to truth, "at least when I use it 
correctly," discount the possibility that without divine grace he might lack the very 
power to use it correctly. It is thus an irony, in light of his "Pelagian" doctrine of will, 
that Descartes aligned himself with the Augustinians in their controversy with the 
Molinist Jesuits.26 
CONCLUSION 
Certainty as posture of control provides a unified context for viewing Cartesian 
metaphysics and Cartesian physical science in their complex interrelationship. 
Cartesian certainty transcends, even while grounding, mathematical physics. For this 
reason Cartesian certainty can serve as the point of departure for a modern 
metaphysical tradition through Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, and Husserl that is no less 
determined by control of the cognitive encounter with the world than is modern 
physical science.27 Certainty plays out in physical science as a kind of ontological 
prescription casting nature in terms of formal mathematical properties. Sense qualities, 
being passively perceived, are denied any ontological 
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status beyond that of indicating the proximity of an object;28 if they belonged to bodies 
themselves, science would be utterly dependent on a passive form of cognition. The 
aspiration to "adequate causality" of one's cognitions explains Descartes's impatience 
with the suggestion that the admission of mere hypotheses or "moral certainty" in 
science signals a flaw in his method. He is in control of the uncertainty of these 
hypotheses. As a mathematical account of phenomena in terms of extension and 
figure, for instance, the theory of eel-shaped water particles in Le Monde rests on 
evidence produced out of the rational ego itself, and thus falls on this side of the divide 
between certainty and "mere probability."29 The theory's uncertainty is sheltered by the 
first moment of Cartesian certainty, the presence, via will to attention, of the absence 
of evidence. Descartes knows that the water particles are too small too be directly 
observed, and that there are no experiments currently available to him that would settle 
the question definitively. Unlike the pre-scientific observer of nature, he may be 
wrong, but he is not deceived. 
Mathematical physics remains an inherently limited form of Cartesian certainty, 
however, for its access to the physical world is inescapably mediated by the senses. 
Thus, although the modern scientific and technological enterprise has succeeded in 
many respects far beyond what Descartes could have anticipated when he envisioned a 
practical philosophy which might make us "lords and masters of nature" (Discourse 
VI; CSM I: 142-143; AT VI: 62), he himself seems to have grown less and less 
confident about its prospects, increasingly turning his attention toward moral concerns. 
Regarding the latter he writes, "Indeed I have found it easier to reach satisfactory 
conclusions on this topic than on many others concerning medicine, on which I have 
spent much more time. So instead of finding ways to preserve life, I have found 
another, much easier and surer way, which is not to fear death" (Descartes to Chanut, 
15 June 1646; CSM III: 289; AT IV: 441-442). The third maxim of the "provisional" 
code of morals in Discourse Three ("to master myself rather than fortune" (CSM I: 
123; AT VI: 25) is therefore to remain in force indefinitely. Elaborating on this "stoic" 
notion of the moral good, Descartes writes to Christina that 
the supreme good of each individual consists only in a firm will to do 
well and the contentment this produces. My reason for saying this is that I 
can discover no other good which seems so great or entirely within each 
man's power. For the goods of the body and of fortune do not depend 
absolutely on us; and those of the soul can all be reduced to two heads, 
the one being to know, and the other to will, what is good. But knowledge 
is often beyond our powers; and so there remains only our will, which is 
absolutely within our disposal. (Descartes to 
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Christina of Sweden, 20 November 1647; CSM III: 324-325; AT V: 
82-83) 
The tension between doing the good, which would depend on knowing the good, and 
doing what we judge to be good, which would not, is thus resolved via the will, which 
produces the presence of the good via attention (being present) to itself. Descartes does 
not inquire after the good, and then raise the question of whether or the extent to which 
it falls under the control of the will. Rather, he demarcates the domain of the will and 
then defines it as the good. The projected telos of mathematical physics, our 
"enjoyment of the fruits of the earth and all the goods we find there," thus gives way to 
the freedom of willing itself. "Cartesian stoicism," one should like to say, is none other 
than the ethical form of Cartesian certainty.30 Indeed, prefiguring and in a way already 
surpassing the Kantian quest for autonomy via a self-legislating will, Cartesian 
certainty from the beginning wants a fulfillment beyond anything to be had in mastery 
of nature via physical science. The latter offers at best a partial autonomy. 
If attention defines the Cartesian will, it also points beyond it. For an irresistible 
inclination of the will absent external compulsion is in some way also a definition of 
faith.31 Descartes seems to be in a sense attempting to invest clear and distinct ideas 
with a certainty traditionally reserved to faith, with the difference that faith as 
understood in the Christian tradition to which Descartes is indebted is a gift and does 
not exclude doubt (thus "I believe, help thou mine unbelief," Mark 9:24). The 
Cartesian emphasis on attention, indeed, calls to mind the twentieth-century religious 
thinker Simone Weil. For Weil, attention is the very substance of faith, yet it is itself 
not an exertion of will power, but a form of "waiting": 
Attention is an effort, the greatest of all efforts perhaps, but it is a 
negative effort. . . . Attention consists of suspending our thought, leaving 
it detached, empty, and ready to be penetrated by the object. . . . We do 
not obtain the most precious gifts by going in search of them but by 
waiting for them. Man cannot discover them by his own powers, and if he 
sets out to seek for them he will find in their place counterfeits of which 
he will be unable to discern the falsity.32 
Perhaps Descartes's doctrine, by its very incoherence, suggests the possibility of an act 
of attention beyond the effort of the will, and an evidence beyond the production of the 
intellect. 
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